Abstract
Introduction
We study the impact of corporate governance on the value of excess cash holdings by firms. Jensen (1986) argues that poorly monitored managers of publicly listed companies may waste free cash by investing money in value decreasing projects. In this context corporate governance could be of great value, if it protects shareholders against such mismanagement and irresponsible dissipation of cash.
In the absence of any market imperfections, the value of €1 on the bank account of firms should be valued equally by the capital market. However, in practice it is possible that management invests this €1 in a project that is worth less. These agency costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) imply that the €1 held within the firm will be valued at a discount. The higher the probability of misallocation of cash holdings under management's control, the lower its market value. Good corporate governance could lower this probability of wasting by management and as such increase the value of firms' cash holdings.
If firms held only little amounts of cash, the sketched problem would be of minor importance. However, firms' cash holdings often are substantial. For the largest publicly listed European non-financial firms the sum of cash and cash equivalents was In this paper we focus on the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash, as this part of cash holdings is most easily accessible by management to derive "private benefits". As pointed out by Myers and Rajan (1998) , it is easier to make cash disappear than to make a plant disappear. We argue that it is even easier to make excess cash disappear, as this part of the firm's cash holdings is not needed for other, economically motivated purposes such as financing new investment opportunities. We are interested in the valuation of excess cash by the market and especially in the influence of corporate governance on this valuation. A first attempt to examine this issue was made by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for U.S. firms.
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that governance has a positive effect on the value of excess cash and on the marginal value of total cash. In particular, the market value of excess cash for firms that have poor internal or external corporate governance in the form of extensive anti-takeover provisions and a low level of large shareholder monitoring, respectively, is found to be approximately one-half of the value of excess cash for firms that are well governed. Depending on the measure of corporate governance, the marginal value of $1.00 held by a poorly governed firm varies between $0.42 and $0.88, compared to $1.27 to $1.62 for a well governed firm.
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) further show that poorly governed firms dissipate cash more quickly 2 and in such a way that they experience lower operating performance. Explanations given by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for the lower value of (excess) cash for poorly governed firms are that these firms invest (more) money in low return projects 3 and that excess cash may make managers "lazy" in the sense that it reduces their incentives to control costs, improve margins etc.
In contrast to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) , our study analyses the relation between four specific governance mechanisms and excess cash, i.e. Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board functioning. Our unique governance dataset provided by Deminor 4 makes it possible to pinpoint which governance provisions influence the value of excess cash and which ones do not. In addition, we 2 This finding is in accordance with Harford et al. (2008) who document a positive relation between corporate governance and cash reserves for U.S. firms. Cross-country (worldwide) evidence also shows that greater shareholder rights are associated with lower cash holdings, see e.g., Dittmar et al. (2003) and Pinkowitz et al. (2004) .
3 Harford et al. (2008) find that poorly governed U.S. firms dissipate their cash reserves more quickly primarily on value-reducing acquisitions than well governed firms, see also Harford (1999) . Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) , however, show that the value effects of excess cash and the reduction in operating performance cannot fully be explained by spending excess cash on acquisitions. focus on the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash for a sample of large publicly listed European firms.
To determine the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash we follow the methodology of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) . We first use a cash model based on Opler et al. (1999) to determine the level of normal or "optimal" cash holdings and define excess cash as the difference between the actual cash holdings and the predicted normal cash holdings. We then employ value regressions as used in Fama and French (1998) and return regressions as used by Faulkender and Wang (2006) to determine the value of (positive) excess cash.
A limited number of other studies also relate the quality of corporate governance to the value of firm-level cash holdings. 5 Pinkowitz et al. (2006) study the relationship between cash holdings and firm value and the influence of governance on that relationship in an international context using a sample of firms from 35 countries. Our main empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the value of excess cash is positively related to the score for the corporate governance 5 A large body of literature explores the influence of corporate governance on the return on equity, firm value and firm performance, see Nesbitt (1994 Nesbitt ( , 1995 , Yermack (1996) , Core et al. (1999) , Gompers et al. (2003) , Bauer et al. (2004) holdings. Cash holdings of these firms are accordingly valued below "face value". On the other hand, firms with low management rights run the risk of being taken over if they destroy value (now or probably in the future) by investing in negative NPV projects or by operating extremely inefficient. Because of this threat of control over the amount of excess cash, the probability that it will be allocated wrongly is smaller and hence excess cash is valued higher.
Second, we find that firms with more anti-takeover provisions hold relatively less (excess) cash. In addition, those firms with high management rights spend their excess cash more quickly and on less profitable investments than firms with low management rights (that is, high governance scores). This indicates that indeed well governed firms operate under the fear of the capital market for misallocation of their excess cash holdings. The other governance mechanisms do not seem to be strong enough to convince the capital market that management will act in the shareholders' best interests.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the Deminor governance data. In section 3 we present the models we use to estimate normal and excess cash levels and the relation between corporate governance and the value of excess cash. Data and summary statistics on cash are provided in the same section. In section 4 we report our empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.
6 Anti-takeover provisions that prevent a successful acquisition by a bidder are seen as an indication of poor corporate governance. This is comparable with the interpretation of the Gompers et al. (2003) measure.
Corporate governance data
We use Deminor ratings to measure the quality of firm-level corporate governance. rights and duties of shareholders (referred to as Shareholder rights in the remainder of the paper); range of takeover defences (Takeover defences); disclosure on financial matters and corporate governance (Disclosure); and Board structure and functioning (Board). For each category a rating is available on a scale from 1 to 10, where a score of 10 (1) corresponds to the best (worst) possible governance quality. The total governance score is simply the sum of the rating scores of the four categories.
The first category of governance criteria, Shareholder rights, concerns the question whether shareholders can exert sufficient power to determine corporate action. The score is based on i) the 'one share -one vote -one dividend' principle; ii) access to and voting procedures at general meetings, and iii) maintenance of pre-emptive rights.
Firms that respect the control and ownership roles of shareholders, score high on the 'one share -one vote -one dividend' principle. Deminor evaluates whether companies submit voting issues that are perceived as particularly significant to the general meeting of shareholders and assesses the voting structure. Furthermore, companies should respect the pre-emptive rights of the existing shareholders as these stakeholders would like to prevent dilution of their voting or economic power.
The second category, Takeover defences, examines the extent to which the firm attempts to decrease the likelihood of a hostile takeover through the adoption of anti- 
Models
To determine the level of excess cash we first need to estimate the level of normal or "optimal" cash holdings for a firm. The regression model that we use for this purpose includes variables that are used in prior literature on the determinants of cash holdings in imperfect capital markets, including Kim et al. (1998) , Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004) , and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . Our main specification for the determination of the level of normal cash holdings is given by 10 To control for country and year effects we regress the total governance scores on country dummies and year dummies and compute industry averages for the residuals from this model. In that case, Our main specification includes measures for size, cash flow, cash substitutes, risk, growth options, and costs of financial distress. These variables are commonly used as proxies for the determinants of normal cash holdings that arise through the transactions motive and the savings motive, where the latter refers to the incentive to accumulate cash for financing new investment opportunities when external finance is costly, see Opler et al. (1999) . Size plays a double role, in the sense that it acts both as a measure of the transactions motive as well as a proxy for access to financial markets. Cash flow and net working capital are interpreted as substitutes for cash. The market-to-book ratio and R&D expenses serve as proxies for growth opportunities, information asymmetry, and financial costs of distress. We expect a negative coefficient for size and net working capital and a positive coefficient for growth opportunities, R&D expenses and risk. The expected sign for cash flow is positive according to the pecking order theory and negative according to the trade-off theory.
The year dummies are included to account for macroeconomic factors which may influence overall demand and supply of liquidity. The firm fixed effects control for the fact that due to idiosyncratic reasons some firms may consistently hold higher or lower normal cash levels than required for economic reasons. Excess cash is defined as the difference between the actual cash holdings and the estimated normal cash holdings, that is, the residual from (1). Following Dittmar and Marht-Smith (2007), however, we do include the firm fixed effects as part of excess cash, as this does not reflect the generally accepted economic reasons for holding cash, such as operational needs or future investments.
11 As Dittmar and Marht-Smith (2007), we include the year fixed effects as part of excess cash as well.
Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) , to determine the effect -if any -of corporate governance on the value of excess cash, we estimate value regressions based on Fama and French (1998) . The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio, which is taken as a measure of total firm value (equity and debt). The regression model includes control variables representing factors that are likely to affect investors' expectations of future net cash flows. Specifically, the control variables are past changes, future changes, and current levels of earnings, R&D expenses, dividends, interest expenses, as well as past and future net assets, and future changes of the market value of the firm. Given that we aim to measure the effect of excess cash on firm value and, in particular, the influence of corporate governance on this effect, we also include excess cash (scaled by net assets) and the interaction between the governance score and excess cash. In addition, the governance score itself is included to control for the fact that corporate governance may affect firm value also through other channels besides excess cash. In sum, for each governance measure, i.e.
the Total governance score and the sub-scores on Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board, we estimate the following regression: (1)) at time t, GOV i,t = Governance measure, which is the governance score for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure or Board, or the overall score for these four categories, YFE = Year Fixed Effects and FFE = Firm Fixed Effects. We include year fixed and firm fixed effects to capture macroeconomic and time trend effects and unobserved heterogeneity and fixed industry effects, respectively.
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Because we are interested in the value of a firm's cash 'surplus' we estimate the value regression using only those firm-year observations for which excess cash is positive. The coefficient of key interest in model (2) obviously is β 18 . If the quality of corporate governance positively influences the value of excess cash, this coefficient for the interaction term between the governance score and excess cash should be positive.
In addition to the value regression model as given in (2), we estimate an alternative model where we focus on value effects of changes in excess cash instead of levels. In this model, which is based on Faulkender and Wang (2006) , the dependent variable is the excess stock return, while the regressors of interest are the change in excess cash and its interaction with the governance score. The main specification of this return model is given by:
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XCash ME dDiv ME dI ME dRD ME dNA ME dE ME dXCash R r where, dX i,t indicates a change in X from time t-1 to t, and r i,t = stock return over year t, R i,t = market model return over year t (we estimate the market model using the year t-1 arithmetic returns derived from the daily stock return index of each firm and the Issuance minus Long Term Debt Reduction)) over year t, GOV i,t = Governance measure and YFE = Year Fixed Effects and FFE = Firm Fixed Effects. In addition to the excess return we will also use the percent change in market capitalization (ME i,t -ME i,t-1 )/ ME i,t-1 as dependent variable in (3).
The control variables in the return regression as given in (3) Again we are interested in the value of a cash surplus, and therefore we estimate the return regression on those firm-year observations with positive excess cash at t-1.
The key coefficient in this model is β 12 . If the quality of one or more corporate governance measures positively influences the value of excess cash, the coefficient for the interaction term between the governance score and the change in excess cash should be positive. Using the estimates of (3) we can also determine the difference in marginal value of €1 held by poorly governed firms compared to well governed firms.
Data
Our sample consists of publicly traded European firms that were included in the FTSEurofirst 300 Index at some point between 2000 and 2004 and were given a governance rating by Deminor. We retrieve data items for these firms-as far as We estimate the normal cash model as given in (1) -insert Table 4 about here - Table 4 shows the number of firm-year observations and summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio per country for the period 1990-2005. The overall mean of the cash-to-assets ratio (Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets) is 15.6%.
Although for most countries the average cash-to-assets ratio is close to this overall mean, for some countries it deviates considerably. Switzerland and Ireland have relatively high average cash-to-assets ratios of 26.3% and 45.8%, respectively.
Countries with relatively low cash-to-assets ratios are Austria, Portugal and Spain with averages equal to 3.8%, 6.0% and 9.5%, respectively. According to Ferreira and Vilela (2004) , this cross-country heterogeneity can be a consequence of different accounting standards as well as different institutional environments, including bankruptcy laws, the state of development of capital markets, and patterns of corporate governance. 14 ratings. We also exclude Vivendi Environment for this company is a subsidiary of Vivendi which also has a Deminor rating.
14 We note that these cross-country differences in our sample should be interpreted with care, as the number of observations for countries such as Ireland, Austria and Portugal are limited. Nevertheless, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) also report a relatively high average cash-to-assets ratio for Ireland and relatively low averages for Austria and Portugal, see also Dittmar et al. (2003) . Our overall average Appendix B presents the same summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio per country for the shorter period 2000-2004 that is used to estimate the value and return regressions. Generally, these correspond quite closely to the numbers in Table 4 .
-insert Table 5 about here - Table 5 presents summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio by industry for the period 1990-2005, while Appendix C shows these for the period 2000-2004. We observe substantial differences across industries, with the mean ratio ranging from a minimum of 0.034 for Paper to a maximum of 0.283 for Drugs, cosmetics and health care, and Electronics. As far as these industry effects are not accounted for by our economic regressors in the normal cash model and as long as they are constant over time, they will be captured by the firm specific dummies included in (1).
Empirical results

Cash model
The results of the cash model are presented in Table 6 . Column 1 presents the results of our main specification as given in (1 Ferreira and Vilela, 2004 , Opler et al., 1999 , Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 , Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007 .
-insert Board, respectively. We find that good governance, as measured by the total score, has a significantly positive effect on the value of excess cash. The results in columns 2-5 reveal that this relation is driven purely by the Takeover defences governance measure. The coefficient on the interaction term between excess cash and this governance measure is positive (0.508) and significant (p-value of 0.038). 15 We interpret this outcome as follows. The management of firms with a low score for
Takeover defences have good possibilities to prohibit being acquired by a hostile bidder. The 'management rights' for these firms are high. If these firms hold excess cash and destroy value because of negative NPV projects (such as overpaid acquisitions) or inefficiency, the capital market is in the worst case not able to take over the firm and to disgorge the cash in order to prevent it from being wasted. The value of their excess cash is accordingly, relatively low. However, if well governed firms hold excess cash, the capital market can, if she wishes, take over the firm and extract the cash if necessary. Because of this threat of control over the amount of excess cash, the probability that it will be allocated wrongly is smaller and, hence, excess cash is valued higher.
-insert Table 7 about hereIn Table 8 , where the governance score is Takeover defences, we report the results of alternative specifications. In column 1, we include normal cash as obtained from the cash model as extra control variable, while in column 2 we also include the interaction term between normal cash and the corporate governance measure Takeover defences. As expected, the coefficient on the additional interaction term is insignificant. Normal cash as part of cash reserves for daily operations and investments is not valued differently between well and poorly governed firms. 15 In untabulated results, we use excess cash as estimated by the models in columns 2 and 3 in Table 6 .
The results confirm the finding that Takeover defences have a significant and positive influence on the value of excess cash.
However, the interaction term on corporate governance and excess cash remains positive and significant, in both columns 1 and 2. In columns 3 and 4, we exclude insignificant control variables from our main value specification (column 3 in Table   7 ). Our results are robust for these alternative specifications.
-insert Governance may be endogenously determined with value as well (see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) . In untabulated results, we estimate our value regression using the 2 year lagged governance score to avoid this endogeneity issue. The results confirm that Takeover defences have a significant and positive impact on the value of excess cash holdings.
As an alternative way to determine the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash and to directly assess the marginal value of excess cash holdings we estimate the return model as given in (3). 16 If we estimate the cash model with the three year lagged sales growth instead of the M/B ratio as proxy for growth opportunities or without proxy for growth opportunities, we still find a significantly positive coefficient for the interaction term between excess cash and governance measure Takeover defences. The results of these alternative cash models are consistent with the results presented in Table   8 and Table 9 .
-insert Table 9 about hereThe results in model [1] confirm that the stock market places a higher value on excess cash for well governed firms relative to poorly governed firms. If we split the sample in non-UK and UK firms then we find that the coefficient is highly significant for non-UK firms.
17
The results in column 4 with excess return as dependent variable do not indicate that governance pays off. However, if we again split the sample in non-UK and UK firms, we find a highly significant positive coefficient on the interaction term
Takeover defences x ΔL XCash / ME for the non-UK firms. This implies that for non-UK firms, the marginal value of excess cash is higher for well governed firms than for poorly governed firms. For the non-UK firms we calculate the marginal value of €1 of excess cash, which is equal to the sum of the coefficient on the change in excess cash 
Corporate governance and the use of excess cash
The results from both the value regressions and returns regressions indicate that excess cash held by poorly governed firms in the form of extensive takeover defences is valued at a discount. As discussed in the introduction, previous research for US firms has documented that poorly governed firms hold relatively high levels of (excess) cash and spend their excess cash more quickly than well governed firms. We conclude this section by examining whether these findings also apply to our sample of European firms. 17 The difference in the results between non-UK and UK firms could imply that the relevance of Shareholder rights for the valuation of unexpected changes in the level of excess cash is higher for non-UK firms than for UK firms. Alternatively, it could be that for this small sample of UK-firms with in general high scores for governance component Takeover defences, it is difficult to capture the effect of governance on the value of excess cash.
First, to analyse the influence of the quality of corporate governance on the level of excesss cash holdings, we return to the cash regression model in (1). We reestimate this model, but including the corporate governance scores. Results are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 . Actual cash holdings are positively related to the total governance rating (see column 4), which is driven by the government measure Takeover defences (see column 5). Note that the positive coefficient for
Takeover defences means that firms with less anti-takeover provisions hold more cash than firms with more takeover defences. Since we do not include governance variables in our main specification for normal cash holdings as given in (1) The results are presented in column 1 of Table 10 . The positive coefficient for Takeover defences indicates that the reduction in excess cash is indeed higher for firms with a low takeover defences governance score. Put differently, firms with a 18 If we regress excess cash on the four corporate governance scores, including firm fixed and year fixed effects, we find a significant coefficient for governance measure Takeover defences (coefficient is 0.005 and a p-value of 0.000) and insignificant coefficients for the other three governance measures. 19 Our results contrast with Dittmar et al. (2003) (2000) finds that the probability that a firm will be acquired decreases with cash and states that managers may hold cash to entrench themselves at shareholder's expense. Following this line of reasoning, firms with a high score for Takeover defences may hold higher levels of cash to protect themselves from being targeted. 21 To analyze whether governance influences the decision to accumulate excess cash, we estimate the regression in (4) for the sample of firm-year observations with both negative excess cash at time t-1 and an increase in excess cash between t-1 and t. We do not find any relation between the accumulation of excess cash and governance. This finding is in accordance with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) .
Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents at time t-1, RealNA i,t = Total Assets at time t inflated to 2005 prices, PPE i,t = Property, Plant and Equipment at time t.
We are interested in the coefficient of the interaction term between lagged excess cash and the lagged governance measure. A positive coefficient (β 3 ) on this interaction term indicates that for every euro of excess cash held at time t-1, firms with bad corporate governance who used up excess cash experience a lower ROA in that year compared to firms with good corporate governance. The results in Table 11 show that this indeed is the case, cf. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) . The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive except -surprisingly -for the corporate governance measure Takeover defences (see column 3). However, if we replace ROA i,t by ROA i,t+1 we find a significantly positive coefficient for takeover defences, while the coefficients of the other governance scores remain significantly positive. Table 11 about hereThe lower value of excess cash held by poorly governed firms could thus be explained by the negative influence of their spending on the ROA. Because of the lack of corporate control, managers of firms with high management rights can potentially destroy value. If these firms had no anti-takeover provisions, the capital market would probably have made corrective actions by taking over control in order to prevent future wasteful spending.
-insert
24
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance and the value of excess cash for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300). We use Deminor ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as 23 If we regress acquisitions divided by net assets on the lagged amount of excess cash and on total governance -including fixed firm and fixed year effect -and we restrict the sample to firms with positive lagged excess cash, we find no relation between acquisitions and the quality of corporate governance. And we do not find evidence that acquisitions have a significant impact on the return on assets. 24 Faleye (2004) The level of excess cash is also related inversely to the extent of takeover defences, while firms with positive excess cash and a low quality of corporate governance spend a larger part of their excess cash than firms with a high quality of corporate governance. We further find that governance positively influences the ROA in the years after the year of spending. If we assume that projects that lower the ROA are negative NPV projects, the "value destructive investing behaviour" of poorly governed firms could explain the value differential of excess cash between well and poorly governed firms.
Appendix A Variables and variable codes
The first column shows the variable name and the second columns shows the database 
